Introduction
Structural change, technological progress and changes in consumers' preferences, have largely been acknowledged as crucial factors in achieving environmental sustainability (Jaffe et al., 1995 and 2002; Popp et al., 2009; Popp, 2010) . Technological progress might improve environmental performance through different channels: a more efficient use of natural resources and lower emission intensity in production activities and through the supply of new more "sustainable" products as substitutes to other less efficient productions. Indeed, firms are key actors in the creation, adoption, diffusion of -and sometimes resistance to -environmental innovations. In this light, the paper is aimed at exploring the links between R&D, environmental (or eco-) innovation and productivity at the firm level, assessing the effect of eco-innovations on firm-level productivity. The modeling framework is borrowed from the Crépon et al. model (CDM hereinafter) , modified to account for differential effects of eco-innovation with respect to non-eco-innovation. The underlying hypothesis is that while the "public" returns to eco-innovation are clearly positive, the "private" returns are often ambiguous, as ecoinnovations can depress firms' productivity, at least in the short run. Needless to say, this represents a clear disincentive for firms to pursue eco-innovation and leave some room for government intervention. This argument stems directly from the "Porter hypothesis", namely the fact that "strict environmental regulations can induce efficiency and encourage innovations that help improve commercial competitiveness" (Porter, 1991) . The hypothesis suggests that strict environmental regulation triggers the discovery and introduction of cleaner technologies and environmental improvements, making production processes more efficient. The cost savings that can be achieved can be sufficient to (over)compensate for both the compliance costs of the new regulations and the innovation costs.
We use four consecutive waves (7 th , 8 th , 9 th and 10 th ) of the Unicredit survey on Italian manufacturing firms for the periods 1995-1997, 1998-2000, 2001-2003, and 2004-2006 . Moreover, in order to recover information on eco-and non-eco-innovation, we match those firms with the EPO and PCT-WIPO patent applications database.
We find a strong and positive effect of patenting activity, while we observe a generally lower return in terms of productivity for eco-innovations relative to other innovations, the difference being greater for polluting firms.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature about the drivers of eco-innovation and its effect on firm's performance; Section 3 contains the description of the data used and discusses the definition of eco-innovation. Section 4 focuses on the description of the empirical model; Section 5 discusses the results, while Section 6 concludes.
Are eco-innovation special?
Most of the literature on eco-innovation patterns at the firm level focuses on the identification of the drivers of eco-innovation, with little attention devoted to the effects of eco-innovation on firms' performance. Recent contributions in this field agreed on a taxonomy of three different sets of drivers of eco-innovation (Horbach, 2008; Horbach et al., 2012) . Market pull factors mostly refer to demand conditions, such as the demand of more environmentally friendly products exerted by consumer (including public procurement). Technology push drivers and other firm-specific factors refer to supply-side factors such as the availability of capabilities to develop eco-innovations in terms of knowledge stock and skills needed to develop and adopt eco-innovations. Finally, regulation aimed at reducing environmental pressures plays a crucial role for ecoinnovation due to the "public good" nature of improvements in environmental performance generated by eco-innovation. This latter component is the one that really characterizes eco-innovation as opposed to other innovations.
While eco-innovations are expected to have, by definition, a beneficial effect on the environment, their effect on firms' productivity performance can be negative. This market failure underlines the necessity of government intervention, by means of the socalled Porter's hypothesis (Porter, 1991) : well designed and stringent environmental regulation can stimulate innovations, which in turn increase the productivity of firms or the value of the product for end users (Porter, 1991; Porter and van der Linde, 1995) . Environmental regulation would be beneficial for both society and regulated firms by triggering dynamic efficiency of firms and these benefits may offset the compliance costs of environmental restrictions. However, this view has been criticized on the ground that any policy aimed at limiting environmental by-products of firms will result in a reduction in observed productivity, at least in the short run due to the fact that policies impose additional constraints to firms (Palmer et al., 1995) . Since these productivity losses cannot be fully recovered, firms might divert resources devoted to generate or adopt environmental innovations from other more profitable research projects with higher expected returns (crowding out effect) in order to offset regulatory compliance costs. The result would be that those innovations that were induced by environmental regulation will have a smaller return in terms of profitability and productivity when compared to other "autonomous' innovations" Ambec et al. (2013) provides a systematic overview of the theoretical foundations of the Porter Hypothesis that emerged from the literature. A first group of studies has motivated the possibility of a positive link between environmental regulation and competitiveness by departing from the paradigm of profit maximization by firms and by introducing behavioral aspects. Sub-optimal behaviors include the lock-in into established routines, bounded rationality and risk aversion of managers. In this framework, environmental regulation forces firms to change established routines or may signal the presence of inefficiency that were not accounted for by bounded rational managers. A second theoretical aspects that may explain the Porter Hypothesis is the presence of market failures in the form of market power, asymmetric information and R&D spillovers. In presence of imperfect competition, regulation may strategically favor domestic firms by granting them a first-mover advantage vis-a-vis competitors abroad that will follow in adopting stringent regulations. Regulation can also introduce barriers to entry thus favoring incumbent firms and may help to reduce asymmetric information between firms and customers by sorting out 'green' and 'brown' firms.
The existing empirical evidence on the extent to which environmental regulation affects economic performance seems to go in the direction of refusing the Porter Hypothesis even though some case of win-win outcome are found. Christiansen and Haveman (1981) review early investigations that looked at the contribution of environmental regulation to the reduction in productivity in the US for the period [1965] [1966] [1967] [1968] [1969] [1970] [1971] [1972] [1973] [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] . Environmental regulation, as compared to other factors (e.g. reduction in capital deepening), accounted for about ten percent of the overall slowdown in productivity that was observed in that period. A negative relationship between environmental regulatory stringency and measured productivity is also found, for the US, by Gray and Shadbegian (1993) (in the paper, oil and steel industries) and Gollop and Roberts (1983, in telectric power industry) while no effect was found in the food industry (Alpay et al., 2002) and a positive effect for refineries in the Los Angeles Air Basin was found by Berman and Bui (2001) . More recently, Greenstone et al. (2012) evaluated the role played by the enforcement of the Clean Air Act on nonattainment counties for a sample of 1.2 million of establishment in the US, finding a negative effect of increased stringency on total factor productivity. It should be noted, however, that most of these studies are based on the evaluation of the Clean Air Act that is a command-and-control regulation, while the Porter Hypothesis emphasizes the need for market-based instruments that are more likely to reward innovative response to regulatory stringency rather than simple compliance to standards. Lanoie et al. (2011) evaluate the effect of environmental regulatory stringency on (eco-) innovation and firm performance for a sample of 4200 firms in 7 OECD countries. They conclude that regulation stimulates eco-innovation but they show that the positive effect of eco-innovation on firm performance does not fully offset the compliance costs. From a more theoretical viewpoint, Acemoglu et al (2012) point out that changes in the relative price of energy inputs have an important effect on the types of technologies that are developed and adopted. Energy intensive, or polluting, firms are likely to have different incentives with respect to other firms, to develop or to adopt eco-innovations. Moreover, the authors argue that without a government intervention, the economy would rapidly go towards an environmental disaster, because the initial productivity advantage would direct innovation and production to the sector of using "dirty" inputs, contributing to environmental degradation. However, an environmental regulation would be sufficient to redirect technical change and avoid an environmental disaster. In the same spirit, Aghion et al (2014) show that firms belonging to the automotive industry innovate relatively more in clean technologies when they face higher tax-inclusive fuel prices, as a proxy of carbon tax.
More recent analyses look empirically at the link between environmental innovation and firm performance: Marin (2014) , using a large panel of Italian firms, finds that innovation efforts of polluting firms are significantly biased towards environmental innovations and that eco-innovations tend to crowd out other more profitable innovations, at least in the short run. Rexhäuser and Rammer (2014) consider the role of regulation-induced innovation: using the German CIS (Mannheim Innovation Panel 2009), they find that cost-reducing innovations aimed at reducing energy and material input have a positive effect on firms' profitability while regulation-induced environmental innovations, mainly aimed at reducing environmental pressures, have a negative but weak effect on profitability. van Leeuwen and Mohnen (2013) investigate the extent to which eco-innovation and other innovations are characterized by complementarity or substitutability in their effect on productivity. Their analysis, based on a panel of Dutch firms, finds no effect of eco-innovation on productivity. Finally, Ghisetti and Rennings (2014) show that for German firms there exists a positive relationship between eco-innovation aimed at improving resource and energy efficiency and financial performance (returns on sales) while a negative relationship emerges for eco-innovations aimed at reducing environmental externalities (e.g. environmental abatement).
A recent contribution by Dechezlepretre et al. (2013) has investigated whether technologies in the "green" fields differ from technologies in other fields in terms of generation of knowledge spillovers. They show that knowledge spillovers generated by patents that belong to four green technology domains (energy production, automobiles, fuel and lighting) are substantially larger than the ones generated by patents pertaining to the four corresponding substitute brown technologies. Moreover, knowledge spillovers from green patents are greater in magnitude than the ones flowing from other recent breakthrough technology fields such as biotechnology, nanotechnology, robotics and 3D printing while they are only slightly (but significantly) smaller than for information technologies.
Summing up, a large part the literature has investigated a sort of "reduced form" relationship between environmental regulation and productivity, finding a negative relationship, some more recent work have focused on the contribution of eco-innovation to productivity and, more generally, on firms' performance, with more mixed results. We contribute to this latter field of literature by providing evidence on the return of environmental patents (as opposed to other patents) in terms of productivity for a large sample of Italian firms.
Data

How to measure environmental innovations
First of all, an unambiguous definition of eco-innovation is needed. There has been a rich debate in the economic literature about the distinctive features of environmental innovations as opposed to general innovations (Rennings, 2000) . Environmental innovation (or eco-innovation) has been defined by Kemp and Pearson (2007) Indeed, this is a broad definition, that makes even more difficult to measure environmental innovation in a comprehensive way, even by means of ad hoc surveys.
As a consequence, patent data could represent an objective and viable alternative to measure eco-innovation (Popp, 2002; Oltra et al., 2010) . Patents contain rich information about the technological field of the underlying innovation, through the international patent classification (IPC) classes and the text contained in the patent or in the abstract. This information is generally exploited through the identification of relevant "environmental" IPC classes or through the systematic search of "environmental" keywords. Moreover, patent data are publicly available, they cover long time spans and do not suffer from sample selection.
Nevertheless, the use of patent data as a measure of innovation 1 and in particular as a proxy for environmental innovation is characterized by some limitations.
As largely documented in the empirical literature, patents cover only a part of the innovation output, as many innovations are not patented either because they cannot be patented 2 or because firms prefer to use alternative means to protect their innovations (secrecy, lead time, etc.).
Moreover, patent data ignore the whole phase of 'adoption' of innovations; thus, it is plausible that a share of patented innovations is not adopted by applicant firms which could act as specialized suppliers of knowledge to other firms (Calel and Dechezleprêtre, 2014) . Finally, common to all the patent studies, the distribution of the value of patents is very skewed, with a tiny proportion of extremely valuable patents and a great majority of patents with little or even no commercial value (Hall et al., 2007) .
Nevertheless, due to their availability and the objective definition, many recent analysis on environmental innovations are based on patent statistics (Lanjouw and Mody, 1996; Brunnermeier and Cohen, 2003; Wagner, 2007; Johnstone et al., 2010) .
In order to identify eco-innovations, we rely on the results provided by the OECD project on "Environmental Policy and Technological Innovation" (ENV-TECH Indicator) 3 , aimed at evaluating the effects of public environmental policy on technological innovation. As a prerequisite for such work, appropriate indicators of ecoinnovation based on patent data have been constructed. Based on selected IPC and ECLA classifications, eco-innovations have been identified and classified according to their technological class. A second source of relevant information was provided by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). In 2010 the WIPO launched the "IPC Green Inventory", with the aim of highlighting environmentally sound technologies within the IPC Classification. The IPC Green Inventory contains nearly 200 topics that are directly relevant to environmentally sound technologies, and each topic is linked with the most relevant IPC class chosen by experts. For this paper, we define ecoinnovation those patents with at least one IPC code belonging to the groups selected by the OECD or by the WIPO 4 (see Table 11 and Table 12 for a list of the selected IPC codes). Even though it is acknowledged by the same creators of the IPC Green Inventory that their definition of 'environmentally sound technologies' could be too broad 5 , we decided to included most of the technology fields in the IPC Green Inventory for two reasons. First, this approach reduces the risk of excluding potential environmental patents, leaving them in the 'non-environmental' category, thus further reducing the (already small) number of environmental patents. Second, the fact that we also consider PCT (non-EPO) patents could be a limitation because they do not report ECLA classes, crucial to identify some specific technologies in the ENV-TECH Indicator (Y02* ECLA classes). The IPC Green Inventory complements the absence of ECLA classes in PCT patents.
Example of environmental technologies are capture, storage, sequestration or disposal of greenhouse gases, renewable energy generation, pollution abatement and waste management.
We further split environment-related technologies into two separate categories, based on their relative content of 'public good' 6 . From the point of view of the generator (i.e. the patent applicant), new environmental technologies could be seen as an impure public good 7 . New environmental technologies improve the performance of the firm in terms of more innovative turnover or improved production efficiency (private component) while they also provide a joint public component in terms of reduced environmental externalities (public component). This is relevant for our purposes because, as a consequence of the presence of some public content of the ecoinnovations, they can have different returns and differential impacts on firms' productivity. The assignment of technology fields to the 'private' or 'public' category is based on the expected relative role played by 'private' returns in each technology field. In the category 'private' environmental innovations we include transport technologies (mainly directed to improve overall energy efficiency), technologies to improve energy efficiency of specific devices (e.g. lighting) or services (e.g. heating), technologies for improved input and output energy efficiency and, finally, various technologies with potential or indirect contribution to emissions mitigation The primary aim of innovations in these technology fields is to improve energy efficiency (with clear private benefits). The category 'public' environmental innovations, on the other hand, includes those technologies explicitly aimed at dealing with environmental externalities (polluting emissions, waste generation and treatment, climate change), for which most of the benefits consist in the reduction of negative externalities, or to develop alternative energy production technologies (mainly renewables) that are not ready to compete in production costs with traditiona fossil fuel technologies.
In order to link patent applicants to firm-level data, we apply the procedure described in Lotti and Marin (2013) . After cleaning and harmonizing firm and applicant names and addresses, we identified both exact matches as well as score matches (based on measures of string similarity). Score matches have been checked one-by-one to minimize false matches. 5 The creators of the IPC Green Inventory state that 'search results may additionally include irrelevant results not relating to ESTs' (http://www.wipo.int/classifications/ipc/en/est/). 6 We thank an anonymous referee for the suggestion. 7 Refer to Kotchen (2006) for a theoretical formalization of green markets as providers of impure public goods.
Firm-level data
We use firm-level data from the 7 th , 8 th , 9 th and 10 th waves of the "Survey on Manufacturing Firms" conducted by Unicredit (an Italian commercial bank, formerly known as Mediocredito-Capitalia). These four surveys were carried out in 1998, 2001, 2004, and 2007 , respectively, using questionnaires administered to a representative sample of Italian manufacturing firms. Each survey covered the three years immediately prior (1995-1997, 1998-2000, 2001-2003, and 2004-2006) and although the survey questionnaires were not identical in all four of the surveys, they were very similar in the sections used in this work. All firms with more than 500 employees were included in the surveys, whereas smaller firms were selected using a sampling design stratified by geographical area, industry, and firm size. We merged the data from these four surveys, excluding firms with incomplete information or with extreme observations for the variables of interest. 8 We obtained balance sheet information from the Company Accounts Data Service (CADS) database at the Bank of Italy and we built an unbalanced panel 9 of 47,990 observations on 11,938 firms throughout the period 1995-2006. Table 1 contains some descriptive statistics for the unbalanced panel: not surprisingly, the firm size distribution is skewed to the right, with an average of 106 employees, but with a median of 33 only. In our sample, only 29% of the firms invest in R&D, with an average of 3,770 euros per employee, but only 6.1% have filed at least one patent application and even less (around 0.7%) have filed an eco-patent. Even though the proportion of eco-patents in our sample (6.2 percent) is low, it is somewhat in line with the average share of eco-patents by Italian applicants as a whole (7.9 percent) and by EU15 applicants (8.7 percent) in the same period 10 . Interestingly, on average, patenting firms have 3 patents each. Nearly 30% of the employees at the median firm are white-collar workers. Turning to the other variables used in the empirical analysis, 62% of the firms in the sample report that they have national competitors, while 27% have international competitors. Nearly a quarter of the firms belong to an industrial group and 38% of the firms in our sample received a subsidy of some kind (mainly for investment and R&D; we do not have more detailed information on the subsidies received). Table 2 shows the distribution of observations by sector and macro-region. Figure 2 and Figure 3 show the propensity to innovate expressed as share of observation performing R&D expenditure, applying for a patent and applying for environmental patent with, respectively, sectorial and size class breakdowns. The propensity to innovate varies substantially across sectors, with medium-high technology sectors such as electrical and optical equipment (DL), machinery and equipment (DK), petro-chemicals (DF-DG) transport equipment (DM) having very high shares of firms performing formal R&D (about 40 percent) and of firms applying for patents (more than 8 When identifying extreme observations we consider the following variables: log value added per employee and log R&D per employee. An observation is considered to be extreme if its value (for any of the variables) is more than three interquartile ranges greater than the third quartile or smaller than the first quartile. We identify 620 extreme observations (1.28 percent). 9 We did not exploit the panel dimension of our dataset due to instability of the panel across waves. In fact, we a balanced panel for only 150 firms (1.26 percent of firms), while 7,360 (61.65 percent) firms were available for one wave (three consecutive years) only. 10 Own calculation based on the OECD REG-PAT Database (edition July 2013). 10 percent). Also the propensity to apply for eco-patents tend to be substantially higher in medium-high technology sectors. Looking at the size class breakdown of innovation propensity, we observe that patent propensity and eco-patent propensity monotonically increase with firms size while the share of R&D-doing firms reaches its peak for the category of firms with 251-500 employees (about 52 percent) while very big firms (more than 500 employees) have lower propensity to perform R&D (about 48 percent). Table 3 reports the share of observations (with a sector and size class breakdown) for which, despite observing at least one patent application, no R&D is reported by the firm. This phenomenon has been also highlighted by Bugamelli et al (2012) and Hall et al (2009) who stress the fact that non-R&D doers innovators tend to focus on rather marginal improvements to existing technologies. On average, about half of the patenting firms do not report or perform formal R&D even though this evidence is very heterogeneous across sectors and size classes. More specifically, the share of patenting firms with formal R&D activities belonging to the class of medium-big firms (between 251 and 500 employees) is three times as bigger than the share of patenting firms with formal R&D activities belonging to the class of small firms (between 11 and 20 employees). Moreover, it is interesting to note that in most sectors the size class of very big firms (more than 500 employees) applying for at least a patent has a lower propensity to perform formal R&D than medium-big firms (between 251 and 500 employees). Finally, the share of patenting firms also performing and reporting formal R&D tends to be higher for medium-high technology sectors 11 than for medium-low technology sectors, reflecting heterogeneity in the complexity of technologies across sectors.
Before moving to the description of the CDM framework, it is worth discussing some preliminary descriptive evidence on the relationship between productivity and patents, both environmental and non-environmental. Table 4 shows the average and median labor productivity (real value added per employee, in thousand euro,) by size class and patenting status. It is evident that patenting firms (second column) are more productive than non-patenting firms (first column), for all size classes. The difference tends to be larger for average than for median values, meaning that, for patenting firms, the average is particularly influenced by few firms with very high levels of productivity. With the only exception of small firms (less than 20 employees), firms with at least one environmental patent (column 4) are characterized by larger productivity ( average and median) than patenting firms with no environmental patents (column 3). Conditional on size only, firms involved in the development of environmental technologies tend to be more productive than firms that innovate in other fields. Also in this case, differences in median values are substantially smaller than differences in average values. Table 5 shows pairwise correlations between productivity and patents (simple count and count per employee), both for the full sample and the sub sample of observations with at least one patent. We observe a positive correlation between all patenting indicators and productivity. However, correlation coefficients tend to be rather small (ranging from 0.16 and basically zero) and systematically greater when considering total patents than patents alone. The unconditional correlation does not seem to highlight strong links between patenting and productivity. However, many confounding factors are expected to influence these relationships and motivate the use of a more "structural" approach to evaluate these links.
The modified "CDM framework"
The so-called "CDM framework" (Crépon et al., 1998) intends to shed some light in the black box of the innovation process at the firm level, by linking innovation inputs to innovation outputs and innovation outputs to productivity, and not only by considering a reduced form relation from innovation inputs to productivity. The CDM framework follows the logic of firms' decisions by distinguishing three types of equations (or groups of equations) for respectively investment in innovation inputs, the production of innovation outputs (or knowledge production function) and the traditional production function augmented to include innovation outputs as additional factors of productivity. We extend the CDM model to include eco-innovations as possible output and to evaluate their impact on productivity, similarly to van Leeuwen and Mohnen (2013) and Marin (2014) . The framework encompasses three groups of relations as shown in Figure  1 . The first consists of the decision whether to invest in R&D or not and how much to spend. The second step is an equation for innovation outcomes (in several versions of the CDM models are dummy variables for the introduction of a new or significantly improved process, introduction of a new or significantly improved product, organizational change associated with process innovation, or organizational change associated with product innovation). The final equation is a conventional labor productivity regression that includes the innovation outcomes as well.
Summing up, productivity is assumed to depend on innovation, and innovation to depend on investment choices. Of necessity, our estimation is cross-sectional only, for two reasons: first, we have few firms cases with more than one year of observation. Second, the timing of some of the questions of the survey is such that we cannot really assume a direct causal relationship since they are measured over the preceding three years in the questionnaire. Therefore, the results that we report should be viewed as associations rather than as causal relationships.
R&D decision
In the first stage, as in the standard CDM model, we consider the decision to invest in R&D. A firm must decide whether to perform R&D or not; then, given that the firm chooses to do R&D, it must choose its intensity. This statement of the problem can be modeled in a standard sample selection framework. We use RD i to denote R&D investment of firm i, and define this decision as follows: (1) where D_RD i is an (observable) indicator function that takes the value 1 if firm i has -or reports -positive expenditures on RD, RD i * is a latent indicator variable such that firm i decides to perform -or to report -expenditures if it is above a given threshold ĉ, w i is a set of explanatory variables affecting the decision, and ε i is the error term. For those firms performing R&D, we observe the intensity of resources spent for these activities: (2) where RD i * is the unobserved latent variable corresponding to the firm's intensity of investment, and z i is a set of determinants of the expenditure intensity. We measure expenditure intensity as the logarithm of real R&D spending per employee. Moreover, we assume that the error terms in Equations (1) and (2) are bivariate normal with zero mean and covariance matrix given by:
The system of Equations (1) and (2) can be estimated by maximum likelihood methods: in the literature, this model is sometimes referred to as a Heckman selection model (Heckman, 1979) or Tobit type II model (Amemiya, 1984) .
Knowledge production function
The combination of innovation inputs (R&D) with internal and external resources may result in the introduction of innovations. Successful innovations have been measured in CDM models in several ways, depending on data availability. Crépon et al (1998) use patent applications count and share of innovative sales as indicators of successful innovations, while other authors (e.g. Hall et al (2009) for Italy and Griffith et al (2006) , for France, Germany, Spain and the UK) use survey-based dummy variables describing the introduction of innovations, generally distinguishing between process and product innovations. In this paper, we use the number of European Patent Office (EPO) and PCT-WIPO patent families 12 sorted by priority year as a measure of innovation output. In this second step, we estimate a knowledge production function with the probability of filing a patent and, alternatively, the number of patent applications as dependent variables. In order to account for that part of innovation activity that has not been formalized, we do not restrict estimation to R&D performing firms only. This is likely to be especially important for small and medium-sized enterprises, which represent nearly 90% of our sample. The outcomes of the knowledge production function are EPO and PCT-WIPO patent families, but classified according two broad categories: eco-patents, as defined in Section 2, and non-eco patents. (4) where RD i * is the latent R&D effort, which is proxied by the predicted value of R&D intensity from the model in the first step, x 1,i and x 2,i are set of covariates and the error terms u 1,i and u 2,i are distributed normally with covariance matrix. Moreover, using the predicted value instead of the realized value is a sensible way to instrument the innovative effort in the knowledge production function in order to deal with simultaneity problem between R&D and the expectation of innovative success. However, given the fact that the model is estimated in sequential stages, conventional standard error estimates will be biased and we present bootstrapped standard errors.
Productivity equation
In the third and final step of the model, production is modeled by means of a simple Cobb-Douglas technology with labor, capital, and knowledge as inputs: (5) where y i is the labor productivity (real value added per employee , in logs), k i is the log of capital stock 13 per worker, l i is the log of employment (headcounts), INNO i * is the predicted number (or the predicted probability) of innovation from the second step, and the m i are the controls.
Results
All of the equations in the model are projected on a list of "exogenous" variables that include a the log of firm size, the log of firm age, year dummies, survey wave dummies, industry dummies (13 industries), and regional dummies (4 regions) 14 . The survey wave dummies are a set of indicators for the firm's presence or absence in the four waves of the survey. 15 The left-out categories for the control dummies in all equations are: sector DA (food and beverage), Central Italy region, year 1995 and the indicator for firms included in the last wave only.
R&D decision
We estimate the first step by means of a Heckman sample selection model (Table 6) . To test for selection in R&D reporting, we first estimated a probit model in which the presence of positive R&D expenditures is regressed on the set of firm characteristics and whether the firm exported at least part of its production. We use this latter variable as an exclusion restriction: with no assumption on the causality link, we assume that being involved in international trade may affect the likelihood of doing R&D, but it 13 Capital stock has been computed by means of the perpetual inventory method. 14 Table 2 reports the distribution of observations by industry and by region together with the list and definition of industries and regions. 15 For example, a firm present in all the four waves will have a '1111' code, '1000' if present in the first only, '1100' if in the first and in the second only, and so forth. These codes are transformed into a set of 14 dummies (24 = 16 minus the 0000 case and the exclusion restriction).
does not have any effect of R&D intensity. It is very difficult to identify those variables that could affect the R&D choice, but not the subsequent R&D expenditures conditional on the decision to perform R&D, since both phenomena are quite similar. As a consequence, our assumption is, inevitably, empirically grounded: we compare the average likelihood of performing R&D and, for positive R&D, the log of its intensity (per employee) between exporting and non-exporting firms (Table 7) . Exporting firms are substantially more likely to perform formal R&D than non-exporting firms, with the difference (0.1973) being significantly different from zero. However, conditional on performing R&D, no statistically significant difference is found between exporting and non-exporting firms in terms of R&D intensity.
Unlike van Leeuwen and Mohnen (2013), we do not have data to separate green R&D from traditional R&D, and this is the reason why, in this step, we model R&D decision as a whole. Nevertheless, in our view, this first stage of the CDM model is necessary to avoid simultaneity problems in the subsequent knowledge production functions.
The results confirm the presence of selection, with a significant correlation coefficient of 0.31. The interpretation of this result is that if we observe R&D for a firm for whom R&D was not expected, its R&D intensity will be relatively high given its characteristics. Conversely, if we fail to observe R&D, its R&D intensity is likely to have been low conditional on its characteristics. In line with the results provided by Hall et al (2012) , conditional on investing, R&D intensity decreases with size. It also falls with age, but this is barely significant. Firms facing international competitors have much higher R&D intensities, as do firms that are members of a group or who receive subsidies of some kind. These last two results suggest that financial constraints may be relevant for these firms when dealing with R&D investments. Finally, human capital (in terms of share of "white collars" on total employees) is, as expected, positively related to both the probability of performing R&D and its intensity.
The knowledge production function
The second step of this modified version of the CDM model has been performed by including in the knowledge production function the predicted log of R&D intensity coming from the first step, mainly to address simultaneity issues. The innovation outcome is estimated for three classes of patents: all patent applications (Total patents), non-eco patents (Non environmental patents) and eco-patents (Environmental patents).
As before, we try to separate the extensive margin from the intensive margin, estimating first a class of models with the probability of having a patent and then, since patents are typically a count measure, another class of models with a Negative Binomial regression as in Hall et al (1984) , namely the NB2 version with the variance of the disturbance expressed as a quadratic function of the conditional mean.
16
16 Overdispersion in our count variables are mainly driven by excess zeros. An alternative way to deal with excess zeros is to assume that part of the observed zeros is the result of a different data generation process than the one for positive counts and hence to employ zero inflated (Poisson or Negative Binomial) models (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998) . We experienced some problems of convergence of the likelihood function when computing bootstrapped standard errors. Point parameters were in line with the results obtained for the negative binomial while standard errors were substantially higher. Results remain available upon request.
The first three columns of Table 8 reports the coefficients of a probit model for the probability of having at least one patent (col. 1), and of a bivariate probit for the likelihood of having a non environmental patent and an environmental patent (col 2a and 2b, respectively). The same structure can be found in Table 9 , that reports the estimated coefficients of the count data model, which can be interpreted as elasticities for logarithmic independent variables (expected relative changes in patent applications count for a relative change in the independent variable) and, for dummy variables as relative change in patent applications count when the variable switches from zero to one (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998) . The predicted R&D intensity is positively related both to the probability of having any patent and to the number of patents. Firm size is correlated to patent propensity, less so if it is an environmental patent, suggesting the existence of smaller firms specializing in green innovations; the same results hold for the count of patent families. However, in the latter case, the elasticity is smaller than unity, meaning that larger firms have on average a relatively lower patent intensity (per employee) than smaller firms. The regional patent stock per capita (as a proxy for the stock of knowledge locally available) has no effect on the likelihood of having patents; human capital turns out to have no direct effect (or negative but weak) on innovative output (for either type of patent applications), once its effect on R&D intensity is taken into account. The extent of competition has no relation with the probability of patenting nor with the number of patent families.
Being involved in a "market for technology" (Arora et al., 2001) , i.e. having bought a patent in the past, is a strong predictor of current patenting activity for all classes of patent applications. Polluting firms 17 are expected to show a systematic bias towards environmental innovations relative to other firms. Firms at least one big polluting plant are expected to be more affected by environmental regulations and more likely to be inspected in order to enforce environmental standards, thus triggering the likelihood of improving their environmental performance by means of environmental innovations. This fact is partly reflected in the patent equation, with polluting firms applying for a greater number of environmental patents even though the effect is barely significant.
Results are largely confirmed using forward citations count 18 instead of raw families count (Table 10 ). The count of forward citations has been acknowledged to be a good proxy for the technological importance and the economic value of the patent (Squicciarini et al., 2013) , thus allowing to account for the heterogeneity of patents in that respect.
Productivity analysis
Following the structure of the CDM model, we use the predicted probabilities and the predicted number of patents coming from the second step as explanatory variables in the productivity equations. Productivity is measured as real value added per employee. Looking at the last three columns of Table 8, Table 9 and Table 10 , one can see that innovation success has a generally positive impact on productivity. This effect, very strong both in economic and statistical terms, is in line with expectations and highlights the relevance of indicators of innovation output based on patents.
Exploiting the partition on eco-and non-eco-patents (col. 4 of Table 8 ) there is evidence of a nihil return in terms of productivity from eco-innovations, while the returns for non-eco-patents are positive and significant. The differential effect for polluting firms is negative and statistically different from zero. When considering the number of patent families (Table 9, our baseline model) and the number of forward citations (Table 10) we still find a strong positive effect of patenting activity on productivity. Again, environmental innovations are characterized by an expected lower return relative to other innovations, although this difference is significant in the case of patent citations only; moreover, it is confirmed the negative effect on productivity of eco-innovations for polluting firms. An increase in the likelihood of filing for ecopatents for polluting firms has a negative and significant effect on productivity.
As a further robustness check, we split the broader set of environmental patents into 'private' and 'public' environmental patents, as described in section 3.1. We adopt the same specifications of our baseline model, with the count of patent families as a dependent variable. Results, displayed on , show that the productivity returns of 'public' eco patents are negative and significant, while those of 'private' eco-patents are sizeable and positive. This gap is in line with expectations: environmental innovations with a relatively more pronounced 'public' component (within a mixed good framework) tend to generate private losses in the short run while 'private' environmental innovations tend to be more similar to other innovations in terms of productivity gains.
In accordance with the literature reviewed in the first part of the paper (van Leeuwen and Mohnen, 2013; Marin, 2014; Rexhäuser and Rammer, 2014) , the generally lower return of environmental innovations relative to other innovations could depend on two, possibly combined, factors. First, the expected positive link between compliance costs of environmental regulations and environmental innovations is likely to divert innovation inputs from general innovations towards eco-innovations with a loss in terms of returns from innovations if the firm, in absence of the regulation, would have chosen to focus on other more promising innovative projects. Second, eco-innovations, especially if they have a 'public' content, are likely to be systematically different from other innovations in terms the distribution of the returns through time due to the fact that they regard newly created markets which are small and fast growing. In this context, short run returns from eco-innovations could be negligible while medium-long run returns could be very high. When considering the differential effect of ecoinnovations for polluting firms, it is important to highlight that these firms are the ones which are expected to face more stringent environmental policies than other firms. This asymmetry in the policy environment forces them to bias their innovation patterns towards innovations aimed at reducing compliance costs (eco-innovations) characterized by a low content of private (i.e. productivity-enhancing) returns.
Conclusions
In this paper we investigate the innovation patterns of Italian manufacturing firms, with a specific focus on the productivity effects of environmental innovations. Our modified version of the CDM model describes innovation patterns consistently with expectations, with R&D being an important input for innovation and patent applications having strong positive effects on labor productivity. Environmental innovations systematically differ from other innovations in their effect on firm's productivity, with a generally lower return than non-environmental innovations, especially so when considering those with a "public" nature. This result, coupled with the limited availability of financial resources to be devoted to R&D activities, is a possible evidence of crowding out of environmental innovations relative to non-environmental ones. It is important to stress that the evidence of crowding out refers to short term indicators of productivity. It is reasonable to assume, however, that positive effects of policy-induced environmental innovations on competitiveness (and possibly measured productivity) predicted by the "strong" version of the Porter Hypothesis (Porter and van der Linde, 1995) would eventually show up, if any, in the medium-long run due to the fact that the returns from eco-innovations mainly depend on early-mover advantages of eco-innovators and on the creation of new markets for "green" technologies. Sectors (Nace Rev. 1.1 sub-sections). DA: food products, beverages and tobacco. DB: textiles and textile products. DC: leather and leather products. DD: wood and wood products. DE: pulp, paper and paper products, publishing and printing. DF-DG: coke, refined petroleum products, nuclear fuel, chemicals, chemical products and man-made fibers. DH: rubber and plastic products. DI: other non-metallic mineral products. DJ: basic metals and fabricated metal products. DK: machinery and equipment n.e.c.. DL: electrical and optical equipment. DM: transport equipment. DN: manufacturing n.e.c. 
